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On December 6, 1992, the secular foundation of the Indian State col-
lapsed, as a mob of over 200,000 Hindu extremists, clad in saffron head-
bands, tore down and demolished the Babri Mosque, a long-standing Mus-
lim edifice located in the northern town of Ayodhya.' Thousands of right-
wing Hindu fundamentalists vigorously participated in the demolition of the
Babri Mosque because they believed Muslim leaders of the Mughal Empire
seized land and constructed a mosque on a site that formerly housed a
Hindu temple.2 These Hindus believe that the mosque was built on a site
commemorating the Hindu god Ram, one of the most revered Hindu gods.3
Proving to be one of the nation's most cataclysmic events, the incident pre-
cipitated intense riotinf throughout India, with the ultimate death toll ex-
ceeding 2,800 citizens. In a matter of only a few hours, the crowd violated
national, constitutional commitments to secularism.
This transformative event demonstrates how religion and nationalism
have become inextricably linked in modem India, frustrating the nation's
constitutional goal of becoming a "secular democratic republic."5 In India,
"secular" is not synonymous with anti-religious; the constitutional defini-
tion of secularism is a grant of freedom of exercise, and not an absence of
all religion.6 Furthermore, secularism in India is the State's guarantee of
freedom of religious association and not a strict separation between Church
and State.
I B.A., University of Chicago, 2001. J.D. candidate, Case Western Reserve University
School of Law, May 2005. I would like to profoundly thank Professor Chodosh and the
Journal of International Law for their guidance and patience on this project, respectively.
Most importantly, I would like to thank my parents and sisters for their enduring support and
inspiration.
1 Ashutosh Varney, Battling the Past, Forging a Future? Ayodhya and Beyond, in INDIA
BRIEFING, 1993 9, 11 (Philip Oldenburg ed., 1993).
2 Id
3 Id
4 Uwe Parpart, Destroying the House that Gandhi built, Asia Times, March 15, 2002, at
http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak (last visited Oct. 7, 2003).
5 INDIA CONST. pmbl.
6 H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 476 (1967)
7 Id. at 477.
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The Ayodhya incident was not the first sign of contention between re-
ligion and the country's legal order. Rather, the conflict culminated decades
of religious and constitutional strain. As one scholar notes, "The razing of
the mosque [by] a frenzied mob of Hindu holy men and young men commit-
ted to Hindutva [Hindu nationalism] seemed to symbolize an eruption of
forces welling up from deep within the polity."'8 No single event in the
country's history better illustrates the confrontation of law and religion and
the inability of politics to contain and the law to protect secularist values in
India's fragile democracy. 9 The forces leading up to the Ayodhya incident
and its tragic aftermath cast profound doubt on whether constitutional secu-
larism is still a plausible goal in the modem Indian democracy. 10 More spe-
cifically, to what extent have explicit constitutional provisions aimed at
protecting interests of religious minorities achieved their purpose? The
following comments from a Bombay Muslim to a Times of India reporter
accurately capture the impact of the mosque destruction on the Muslim per-
spective of constitutional protection, "[T] he events in Ayodhya on Decem-
ber 6 and subsequent developments have made one thing clear to us: the
Constitution can no longer protect us. The so-called secular state cannot
uphold our rights."'1 Put simply, how is it possible for the Indian State to
guarantee freedom of religion if the Hindu majority wishes to impose some-
thing else?
12
The culmination of religious extremism embodied in the Ayodhya in-
cident is not an isolated moment, but rather, the watershed of a new era of
religious strife and violence in India.13 Residents of Bombay (now Mum-
bai), the country's urban hallmark of secular modernity, the capital of re-
lentless commercialism, and a showpiece of globalization, dramatically
experienced the social and economic reverberations of the Ayodhya vio-
lence. Bombay's social climate on December 7, 1992 illustrates how pro-
8 Philip Oldenburg, Introduction, in INDIA BRIEFING, 1993 1 (Philip Oldenburg ed., 1993).
9 Granville Austin, The Constitution, Society, and Law, in INDIA BRIEFING, 1993 103,
125 (Philip Oldenburg ed., 1993).
10 A comprehensive analysis of secularism in India is beyond the scope of this Note. The
Note, however, will focus on "constitutional secularism" to limit the study of secularism to
India's constitutional experience. "Constitutional secularism" in the context of the Ayodhya
controversy suggests that secularism must be understood within the broader framework of
the document's commitment to social reconstruction and the history of religious tension in
India. Thus, for purposes of this analysis, constitutional secularism refers to a unique brand
of secularism aimed to reverse traditional religious biases. See GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN,
THE WHEEL OF LAW: INDIA'S SECULARISM IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 13
(Princeton University Press 2003).
1 Dileep Padgaonkar, This is Not Bombay, in WHEN BOMBAY BURNED 1, 8 (Dileep
Padgaonkar ed., 1993).
12 Id. at Il.
13 For a more accurate account of the chronology of violence in large urban areas like
Bombay, see Padgaonkar, supra note 11, at xi.
[Vol. 37:85
ENSHRINING A SECULAR IDOL
foundly the Ayodhya event disturbed daily life in the city, as the city was
literally being ripped apart by sectarian violence. 
14
Empirically, the impact of the mosque destruction was most severe in
Bombay, where hundreds of Hindu and Muslim demonstrators were killed
in a matter of days. 15 The violence erupted into massive rioting in the early
parts of 1993, fueling some of the country's most heinous acts of destruc-
tion since its birth, only forty-six years earlier. Violent rioters (Hindus and
Muslims) burned down hundreds of shops with kerosene, torched bus de-
pots, and burned families alive in their own homes.' 6 As the political, so-
cial, and economic structure in Bombay deteriorated at an exponential rate,
many Hindus and Muslims realized the only real solution to the violence
was to leave the city. Thus, in the early months of 1993, "[I]t [was] esti-
mated [that] 60,000 people had left their shattered lives and homes behind
them. By the middle of the next week, the number of refugees was esti-
mated to have gone up to 150,000."' 7 While the rioting finally showed
signs of subsiding by early February of that year, the nation was reminded
that the struggle was far from being extinguished on March 12, 1993, when
a series of nine bomb explosions throughout Bombay claimed the lives of
over 400 innocent civilians, leaving the country's financial capital in utter
social and economic disarray.'
8
Although the extent of religious violence in Bombay and other parts of
the country has been neutralized since the immediate aftermath of Ayodhya,
the tension between Hindus and Muslims remains a pervasive source of
conflict in modem India. A group of Muslim fundamentalists reignited the
violence in March of 2002, when they set a train on fire in the Gujarati city
of Godhra that was transporting several Hindus to Ayodhya for participation
in plans to build a temple on the site of the former Babri Mosque. While the
attack on the train killed fifty-eight people, the violence that ensued in west-
em India claimed over 200 lives in a period of only four days.1 9 However,
the Hindu victims in the Godhra tragedy were perhaps not innocent by-
standers. One alternative theory provided that the violence began when a
group of Hindu militants refused to pay for snacks at the Godhra railway
station, and as the Muslim stall owner contested the theft, the Hindu mob
14 Clarence Fernandez and Naresh Femandes, The Winter of Discontent, in WHEN
BOMBAY BURNED 12, 13 (Dileep Padgaonkar ed., 1993).
15 THOMAS BLOM HANSEN, WAGES OF VIOLENCE: NAMING AND IDENTITY IN POSTCOLONIAL
BOMBAY 121 (2001).
16 Clarence Fernandez and Naresh Fernandes, A City at War With Itself in WHEN BOMBAY
BURNED 42, 46-48 (Dileep Padgaonkar ed., 1993).
17 Id. at 69.
18 For a detailed account of the bomb explosions, see Fernandez, supra note 16, at 105.
19 See Celia W. Dugger, More Than 200 Die in 3 Days of Riots in Western India, N.Y.
TIMES, March 2, 2002, at Al.
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seized his sixteen year-old daughter.2 ° Subsequently, the girl's outcry and
her father's pleas for help compelled two other Muslims to board the train
as it left the station, who retaliated by attacking innocent passengers on the
train.21 Some Muslims even reported that the attack was a pre-planned ef-
fort by members of Hindu fundamentalist groups like the Sangh Parivar to
justify violence against Muslims. 22 Although the credibility of this alterna-
tive theory about who triggered the violence in Godhra is still under investi-
gation, the amount of destruction caused by the ensuing rioting has been
confirmed. The Hindu rampage that followed the Godhra attack resulted in
the destruction of $600 million of Muslim property and the demolition of at
least thirty mosques in the nearby city of Ahmedabad alone.23
Thus, the continuous incitement of violence reminds the country's con-
sciousness that Ayodhya is not just a moment of India's history; it is inex-
tricably linked to the nation's present and future. As one reporter con-
cludes, "The mosque is a touchstone of Hindu-Muslim tension in a sprawl-
ing nation where people of nearly every religion generally live peaceably. 24
The ineffectiveness of the law, and particularly the Constitution, to contain
and curtail the religious contention further captures the severity of the con-
flict.
In his address commemorating the golden jubilee of the republic and
the constitution on January 27, 2000, President K.R. Narayanan employed
an introspective approach in examining the effectiveness of the Indian Con-
stitution: "[T]oday when there is so much talk about revising the Constitu-
tion or even writing a new Constitution, we have to consider whether it is
the Constitution that has failed us or whether it is we who have failed the
Constitution." 25 The President's perspective poses an important challenge
for India to examine how secularist constitutional protections have been
invoked in cases like Ayodhya, where religion is the source of the dispute.
The principle of constitutional secularism permeates the Ayodhya situation,
where the religious dispute culminated in a legal action brought by Hindu
20 Zafar Bangash, Thousands Dead and More Trouble Feared as Hindus rampage in In-
dia, MEDIA MONITORs NETWORK, March 18, 2002, at http://www.mediamonitors.
net/bangash20.html (last visited January 12, 2004).
21 id.
22 See Gujarat Violence was Pre-planned, at http://www.islamicvoice.com/june.2002/
community.htm (last visited January 12, 2004).
23 See Zafar Bangash, The Real Story Behind The Hindu Rampage Against Muslims in
India, at http://islamicsydney.com/printable.php?id=362; See Human Rights Watch website
at http://hrw.org/report/2003/india0703/Gujarat-02.htm
24 Dugger, supra note 19, at A 1.
25 Sukumar Muralidharan, A Presidential Intervention, 17 Frontline, No. 3 (Feb. 05-18,
2000), available at http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl17030250.htm (last visited Oct. 13,
2003).
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Nationalist groups challenging property rights over the disputed site in
Ayodhya.26
In order to trace the trajectory of constitutional secularism in modem
India, this Note will focus on the behavior of the Indian Supreme Court, the
institution that has played an integral role in resuscitating submerged consti-
tutional values. The character of the Supreme Court underwent a transfor-
mation after the 1975 Emergency.27 During the Emergency regime, a pe-
riod of totalitarianism initiated by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the Su-
preme Court facilitated Indira Gandhi's despotic behavior by conceding
absolute power to Parliament and relinquishing its power to uphold funda-
mental rights. The Supreme Court's accommodating approach to the Prime
Minister's totalitarian regime was particularly disappointing to the national
constituency because "[t]he major areas of the law and Constitution affected
substantially by the emergency amendments were the very areas in which
most people then, and almost now, expected a vigorous assertion of judicial
power by the highest Court in the land.,
28
In order to restore its legitimacy and institutional independence, the In-
dian Supreme Court aspired to bury its emergency past through an over-
whelming surge of judicial activism. The post-Emergency activist court has
played a critical role in creating a framework of lawfulness and consistency
in order to protect individual rights.29 It is therefore critically important to
examine how Indian constitutional adjudication has protected religious mi-
norities in the post-Emergency era.30 By using the Ayodhya situation as a
doctrinal predicate, and investigating relevant case law beyond the Ayodhya
decision, this Note seeks to ascertain whether constitutional secularism is
capable of surviving in the modem Indian democracy.
Section II of this paper will provide the history of Indian constitution-
alism and the framers' goals for secularist provisions. Section III will pro-
vide a critical assessment of the Supreme Court's ability to maintain a secu-
larist approach by analyzing the Ayodhya property dispute in Faruqui v.
Union ofIndia, as well as peripheral case law involving religious disputes in
other arenas such as education and employment. Section IV will provide
prospective solutions through the judicial and non-judicial role in the pre-
26 This will be examined in more detail in Faruqui v. Union ofIndia, AIR 1995 S.C. 613,
in supra Part III. For a definition of constitutional secularism, see note 10.
27 See generally UPENDRA BAXI, INDIAN SUPREME COURT AND POLITICS 123-25 (1980)
(arguing that the Indian Supreme Court demonstrated a surge of judicial activism in order to
re-establish its legitimacy in the post-Emergency period.)
28 Id. at 39-40.
29 Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, Redoing the constitutional design:
from an interventionist to a regulatory state, in THE SUCCESS OF INDIA'S DEMOCRACY 127,
132 (Atul Kohli ed., 2001).
30 The 1975 Emergency was a regime of totalitarianism instituted by Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi, and caused the Supreme Court to lose legitimacy by implicitly supporting the re-
gime. For a more detailed explanation of the Emergency, see supra Part II.
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vention of religious violence and constitutional protection of religious
groups. Section IV will also consider reliance on the trust mechanism as a
method of achieving settlement of religious conflicts like Ayodhya. Section
V will conclude that despite its imperfections, the judiciary is the most ap-
propriate institution to interpret and protect values of constitutional secular-
ism.
1. Legal Background of the Indian Constitutional Tradition
India's early leaders reveled in their accomplishment of the extrication
of centuries of colonial bondage from British rule. The members of the
Constituent Assembly, however, quickly realized that establishing a uni-
form system of governance in a newborn nation with profuse economic,
religious, and social diversity would perhaps prove to be a more formidable
task than acquiring the independence itself. At the time of Independence,
the constitutional framers struggled to establish equality among their con-
stituents because religious hierarchy was so deeply embedded into the coun-
try's social fabric.31 Thus, India's constitutional framers wrestled with the
challenging task of providing sovereign expression for a diverse and volatile
population.32 Moreover, the document had to be contextualized in relation
to the larger social and political challenges that the country faced. The
document's great length and meticulous attention to detail embodies the
tumultuous political and social context surrounding its drafting and enact-
ment.33
The framers of the Indian Constitution were especially cognizant of the
unique religious divisions plaguing the nation at the time of Independence.34
One author uses the term "ameliorative secularism" to describe a model of
Indian secular constitution because he believes it "seeks an amelioration of
the social conditions of people long burdened by the inequities of relig-
iously based hierarchies, [while] embody[ing] a vision of intergroup comity
whose fulfillment necessitates cautious deliberation in the pursuit of abstract
justice., 35 By identifying and addressing the significance of the political
and social culture that existed in the newborn country, Indian constitutional
framers endeavored to create a document that unified the nation.
31 See generally GRANVILLE AusTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTiTUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A
NATION 50 (Oxford University Press 2000) (1966) (arguing that the Indian Constitution is
predominantly a social document aimed to reverse traditional social beliefs and practices).
32 JAMES T. MCHUGH, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITIONS 103 (2002).
33 Id.
34 For a more extensive discussion on the goals of the Constituent Assembly, see
GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A NATION 4-24 (Oxford
University Press 2000) (1966).
35 JACOBSOHN, supra note 10, at 94.
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A. History of Religious Divisions
In the backdrop of constitutional goals, the history of religious tension
in India is highly relevant because it is a long and turbulent history that gal-
vanized centuries of antagonism between Hindus and Muslims.36 The his-
tory of conflict between Hindus and Muslims began before Independence
when leaders of the Muslim League demanded a separate homeland and
refused to join the Constituent Assembly. Their demand was fulfilled on
August 15, 1947 through the promulgation of the Indian Independence Act,
recognizing the existence of two independent states on the sub-continent,
India and Pakistan that substantiated the British divide-and-rule policy.
37
The plan required a partition of portions of northern and eastern India
to create the Muslim State of Pakistan. 38 The execution of the plan insti-
gated atrocious acts of communal violence between Hindus and Muslims,
who became refugees in their own land in order to arrive at their proper
countries.39 Hindus residing within the boundaries of the newly formed
Pakistan were strongly encouraged to relocate within the boundaries of In-
dia while Muslims traveled westward to Pakistan out of safety concerns and
a fear for their lives. The estimates of how many people died vary from
500,000 to 1.5 million, and many scholars have settled upon the figure of
one million.40 Tragically, the glory of the Independence celebration quickly
transformed into a catastrophic display of bloodshed and horror as millions
of Sikhs, Hindus, and Muslims were uprooted from their homes as a result
of the Independence exodus. 41 The atrocious outburst of violence seem-
ingly dwarfed any of the heinous acts of genocide committed in Bosnia or
Rwanda. 42 Thus, the history of Partition permanently tainted relations be-
tween Hindus and Muslims on the subcontinent.
36 John J. Carroll, In the Shadow of Ayodhya: Secularism in India, in HINDUISM AND
SECULARISM AFTER AYODHYA 25, 26 (Arvind Sharma ed., 2001).
37 AUSTIN, supra note 34, at 8.
38 Flashback to Indian Partition, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/southasia/1751044.
stin (last visited Jan. 12, 2004).
39 id,
40 See The Partition of India, at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/southasia/History/ Independ-
ent/partition.html (last visited January 12, 2004).
41 Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, Hurrying Midnight, TIME, August 11, 1997
Vol. 150 No. 6, at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/1997/ int/970811/spl.midnight.html
(last visited Jan. 12, 2004).
42 Id.
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B. The Constitutional Goal of Unification
From the inception of the Independence movement in India, Mahatma
Gandhi and other leaders insisted the country's independence could only be
achieved if it rid itself of all remnants of British rule by creating a home-
made system of government, and adopting a Constitution to specifically
meet the needs of the burgeoning democracy.43 This gave rise to Nehru's
vision of democratic socialism, which aspired to affect a social revolution in
India by injecting provisions of social justice and equality into the Constitu-
tion.44 As the first prime minister of India, Nehru was committed to amelio-
rating the vast social and economic inequalities that existed in India before
Independence in order to create a truly democratic and progressive nation.
As Granville Austin explains, "The Indian Constitution is first and foremost
a social document. The majority of its provisions are either directly aimed
at furthering the goals of the social revolution or attempt to foster this revo-
lution by establishing the conditions necessary for its achievement.
'A5
C. Secularism in the Constitution
In light of the religious and economic biases existing at the time of In-
dependence, framers of the Constitution aimed to ensure equal justice to all
constituents by incorporating specific provisions into the document. Parts
III and IV of the Constitution, dealing with fundamental rights and directive
principles of State policy, respectively, are among the most relevant in se-
curing social justice and creating a unified constituency. The provisions of
Parts III and IV emphasize the need to improve the social and economic
conditions of the people by securing a great number of individual freedoms
for the citizens. They also emphasize that it is essential to maintain the po-
litical unity of the country.46
The explicit prohibition of religious discrimination in the text of the
Constitution expresses the severity of religious inequality favoring upper
class citizens at the time of Independence. Article 15(1) of the Constitution
provides that "The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on
grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them,"
while 15(2) prohibits discrimination by private entities that provide public47
accommodations and by public entities funded by State monies. Article
16 ensures equal opportunity in all spheres of public employment, which is
43 For an in-depth look at Gandhi's notion of"swaraj", see AUSTIN, supra note 34, at 1.
44 For more on the Nehruvian goals of social policy, see P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA: ITS PHILOSOPHY AND BASIC POSTULATES 19 (1969).
45 AUSTIN, supra note 34, at 50.
46 GAJENDRAGADKAR, supra note 44, at 15.
47 INDIA CONST. Art. 15.
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defined as "any office under the State," and Article 17 abolishes untouch-
ability, the lowest recognized strata of the Hindu caste system.48 Because
members of the Constituent Assembly did not believe that Articles 15
through 17 would be sufficient to protect religious minorities, they included
Articles 25 through 28, to more specifically address the freedom of religion
and to create a unified State.49 While some opponents to the extra articles
argued that the additional protections contradicted the constitutional goal of
secularism, the framers decided that the meaning of secularism, as contem-
plated by the Constitution, did not preclude religious protections; rather, it
provided a sense of religious harmony.50
One distinguishing feature of constitutional secularism in India is charac-
terized by the State's promise that it will not identify itself with or be con-
trolled by any singular religion. Additionally, the State ensures the right to
practice whatever religion one chooses to follow without according any
preferential treatment to any of them, and guarantees that no discrimina-
tion will be exhibited by the State against any person on account of his re-
ligious beliefs. 51 Finally, constitutional secularism in India provides every
citizen an equal right to enter any office under the State.52
Therefore, the Indian Constitution aims to reverse traditional sources of
dispute and discrimination by establishing a constitutional scheme to protect
minority interests.53 In India, affirmative or positive discrimination has
been written into the Constitution itself because it focuses on not only
equality as a right available to all citizens, but emphasizes equality as a pol-
icy aimed at changing the structure of society.54 In an attempt to transform
ancient beliefs and practices, the framers of the Constitution included spe-
cific provisions to facilitate the process of change.
55
D. The Role of the Judiciary
Although recognizing the existence of fundamental rights was the first
step towards achieving India's social revolution, establishing a legal
mechanism for enforcement of those rights was a paramount concern for the
48 INDIA CONST. Art. 16 and 17.
49 M.V. PYLEE, INDIA's CONSTITUTION 120 (Asia Publishing House 1967) (1962).
50 Id. at 123.
51 id.
52 id.
51 "The quest for political and social unity has been the most important goal of the Indian
constitutional tradition." MCHUGH, supra note 32.
54 ANDRE- BETEILLE, SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN INDIA: ESSAYS IN A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 206-7 (1991).
55 The effectiveness of this transformation is a completely separate question that will be
addressed in supra Part III.
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nation's early leaders. By making the rights in Part III justiciable, the Con-
stitution inadvertently confers power upon the Supreme Court to safeguard
them. While Article 124 of the Constitution creates an independent Su-
preme Court with original, appellate, and advisory jurisdiction in an inte-
grated national and local system,56 the Indian judiciary is a unique system;
one which has been described as a hybrid system that "join[s] the parlia-
mentary sovereignty of the British model with the judicial review of the US
model. 57 Because the Indian system does not adhere to an equal separation
of powers system like the American paradigm, the Indian Supreme Court
has not always succeeded in exerting its activism. This was especially ap-
parent in the first four decades of the Court's existence, where it was "pitted
against the Nehru and Gandhi government's efforts to expand parliamentary
sovereignty at the expense of judicial review." 58
The ongoing battle between parliamentary supremacy and judicial in-
dependence in enforcing fundamental rights crippled the Indian justice sys-
tem throughout the half-century, creating extreme ambiguity in the arena of
civil liberties. 59 The institutional dilemma culminated in the mid 1970s
during Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's proclamation of Emergency, which
led to a brief period of totalitarianism and authoritative rule. Threatened by
an electoral mal-practice case against her pending in the Supreme Court,
Indira Gandhi declared a state of Emergency on June 25, 1975 on account
of internal disturbance threatening the order and security of India. Her fear
of losing power compelled her to declare Emergency, during which all lead-
ers of the opposing party were arrested, strict censorship was imposed, and
police forces and spies were dispatched to detect any modicum of resis-
tance.6 °
As a result of the declaration, all fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution were suspended, including the right to petition the courts for
writs of habeas corpus.6 1 Consequently, thousands of citizens were indis-
criminately detained with no opportunity to seek redress from the courts.62
56 See INDIA CONST. Art. 124.
57 Rudolph, supra note 29, at 132.
58 Rudolph, supra note 29, at 132.
59 The institutional struggle entailed the parliamentary abuse of the amendment process to
limit the Supreme Court's constitutional power to enforce fundamental rights. In a landmark
case, the Court held that certain basic features of the Constitution could not be altered by
Parliament. See the discussion of Keshavananda v. State of Kerala in Rudolph, supra note
29, at 133.
60 See generally SACHCHIDANAND SINHA, EMERGENCY IN PERSPECTIVE: REPRIEVE AND
CHALLENGE 45-49 (1977). (explaining that Indira Gandhi's declaration of Emergency was
fueled by two main events: the pending case before the Supreme Court and the electoral
defeat of Congress in Gujarat.)
61 Derek P. Jinks, The Anatomy of an Institutionalized Emergency: Preventive Detention
and Personal Liberty in India, 22 Mich. J. Int'l L. 311, 345 (2001).
62 Id.
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Ironically, the Supreme Court supported the Emergency regime by ruling
that the presidential order suspending certain fundamental rights was consti-
tutional.
While the Supreme Court's tacit support of the suspension of funda-
mental rights during Emergency caused it to lose legitimacy in the eyes of
the general constituency, it inadvertently led to the emergence of a resur-
gent, activist bench. In the aftermath of the Emergency regime, the Indian
Supreme Court exerted discernible efforts to safeguard fundamental rights
and to consider the interests of the poor and powerless. 64 Since being chas-
tised for its behavior during the Emergency regime, the Court has employed
a more active role in enforcing human rights against state abuses including
police brutality and rape, and has even extended its activism to public con-
cerns like clean air and water since the early 1990s.
65
In the case of Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das decided in
January of 2000, the Supreme Court honored its constitutional commitment
to promoting human rights against state abuses by reversing a High Court
decision ruling against a Bangladeshi woman who had allegedly been gang
raped by several employees of the Eastern Railway. 66 The High Court re-
fused to award damages in a civil suit brought by the victim because it held
that fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution only apply to Indian
citizens; thereby precluding the Bangladeshi woman from recovering in this
case. 67 However, the Supreme Court reversed the decision and awarded
damages on the basis that the right to life and dignity is a universal constitu-
tional safeguard, extending to non-citizens as well as citizens. 68 In a force-
ful opinion condemning acts of sexual violence, the Supreme Court demon-
strated a zero tolerance approach towards government misconduct by forc-
ing the government to accept accountability for the brutality of its employ-69
ees.
Additionally, the Supreme Court has arguably played the most signifi-
cant role in actualizing constitutional protections of fundamental rights by
standardizing and promoting pivotal concepts of industrial jurisprudence. 0
In fact, the post-Emergency Supreme Court has addressed its responsibility
of constitutional interpretation very seriously in recent years and has even
magnified seemingly ordinary cases into important constitutional controver-
sies.
63 Id.
64 Rudolph, supra note 29, at 134.
65 Id.
66 Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das, 2000 SOL Case No. 039, available at
http://www.supremecourtonline.com/cases/8951 .html (last visited Feb. 28, 2004).
67 Id. para. 6.
68 Id. para. 29..
69 Id. para. 39.
70 See GAJENDRAGADKAR, supra note 44, at 53.
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Thus, the Indian Supreme Court's approach towards the constitutional
adjudication of fundamental rights is invaluable to this study of constitu-
tional secularism. Because the Supreme Court has demonstrated its strong
commitment to upholding constitutional protections, the legitimacy of secu-
lar provisions like Article 15 (prohibition of religious discrimination) could
best be analyzed through the lens of judicial behavior.
111. The Indian Supreme Court's Approach to Constitutional Secularism
In addition to the religious violence that was triggered by the destruc-
tion of the Babri Mosque, a legal dispute questioning the property rights of
the site further engenders the gravity of the conflict between Hindus and
Muslims. The property dispute over the site between Hindus and Muslims
is an ancient controversy dating back to 1853."' In 1859, the British colo-
nial administration divided the site by erecting a fence and allowing the
Muslims to worship in the inner court and the Hindus to worship in the
outer court.72 After Independence, both parties filed a civil suit in the High
Court of Allahabad and the government proclaimed the premises :a disputed
site and prohibited any type of worship while the case was pending. 73 How-
ever, the case was eventually quashed, and the site remained disputed be-
cause many Hindus continued to worship on the peripheral areas of the site.
In an attempt to restore communal harmony in the country in the midst
of the Ayodhya violence, Parliament, upon the President's request, enacted
The Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Ordinance in January of 1993,
which permitted the government to acquire the disputed and undisputed
land until the outcome of final adjudication had been determined. While the
main premise of the legal action involved a property rights dispute over the
2.77 acres of land where the Babri Mosque had stood, the sixty-seven acres
of undisputed land surrounding the mosque had also been transferred to the
custody of the Central Government. The undisputed land was primarily
seized to ensure that no alterations were instituted on the surrounding plot
of land until the Court disposed of the original title suit.74 The government
took control of the peripheral land in order to avoid the outcome of the Al-
lahabad case, where Hindus continued to worship on the adjoining land of
the mosque even though the High Court prohibited any worship on the site
and adjacent land. Many residents who had legal title to parcels on the
71 Timeline: Ayodhya Crisis, October 17, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/world/southasia/1844930.stm (last visited Feb. 28, 2003).
72 id.
73 Id.
74 Purnima S. Tripathi, The Ayodhya Game, 19 FRONTLNE, No. 3 (Feb. 02-15, 2002),
available at http://www.flonnet.com/fl1903/19031260.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2003).
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sixty-seven acre undisputed plot asserted a cause of action to question the
constitutionality of the legislation.75
Additionally, Muslim residents attacked the legislation because they
believed that by requiring the state of worship on the site to remain status
quo, which allowed Hindu worship to continue notwithstanding a govern-
ment prohibition, the act was slanted towards Hindus and was repugnant to
secular provisions in the Constitution.76 The Supreme Court disposed of
these issues in the 1995 case of Faruqui v. Union of India. The term
"status quo" in this case provides that management of the area and the state
of worship on the disputed land remains as it existed on January 7, 1993. 77
A. Faruqui v. Union of India (1995)
In its first legal confrontation of the sectarian violence that persisted
since the Babri Mosque destruction, the Supreme Court overtly condemned
the destructive act. It emphatically explained, "The perpetrators of this deed
struck not only against a place of worship, but also at the principles of secu-
larism, democracy and the rule of law enshrined in our Constitution. 78
Although the Court affirmed a rhetorical commitment to secularism, its ad-
herence to secularism in resolving the underlying legal issues was not as
clear.
On the question of whether the legislation contained anti-secular provi-
sions by maintaining the status quo at the disputed site, the Court employed
a comparative analysis of the state of worship on the site prior to the
mosque destruction. Because it concluded that "the Muslims have not been
offering worship in any place in the disputed site,"79 since 1949, the major-
ity held that the status quo provision did not violate Article 15 or Article 25
of the Constitution, which prohibits religious discrimination by private or
public entities and ensures religious freedom, respectively. However, the
Court failed to acknowledge that the High Court case brought in 1947 pro-
hibited any form of worship on the site and the Hindus were violating a
75 It is worthwhile to mention that the Allahabad High Court case and all other pending
cases were quashed when the Ayodhya case was brought before the Supreme Court. Unlike
the High Court case, the case before the Supreme Court only contemplated the constitutional-
ity of the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act. As noted in Section Two, the Indian
judicial system is an integration of the state and federal systems, where the Supreme Court
serves as the apex court and the High Court stands at the head of each state's judicial admini-
stration.
76 Because Hindu worship had unlawfully persisted on the site even after the High Court
prohibited any worship on the site while the case was pending in 1947, status quo was inter-
preted to allow Hindus to continue worship.
77 Faruqui v. Union of India, AIR 1995 S.C. 605, 632.
71 Id. at 613.
'9 Id. at 633.
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court order by continuing to worship there. Additionally, the Court under-
mined the freedom to exercise one's religious practices by allowing Hindus
to worship but forbidding Muslims to worship on parts of public property.
80
While wrapping its decision in the language of secularism, the Court
allowed the unlawful Hindu worship to continue while precluding Muslim
worship near the site by relying on the historical conditions. The history
that the Court referenced was based on the disputed theory that archaeologi-
cal evidence indicates that a temple [at least a building with pillars] had
existed on the Babri Mosque site since the eleventh century.8' History re-
ports indicate that even after the mosque was constructed, Muslim leaders
permitted Hindus to worship on a platform outside the mosque. 2 However,
the Court's historic rationale is clearly flawed because the "history" of
Hindu worship resulted from a violation of a 1947 court order and the ar-
chaeological evidence cited was not proven to be exhaustive. 3 The Court
performed all types of judicial acrobatics to justify Hindu access to the site
by overlooking why Hindus continued to pray on the site after 1949. Thus,
the Court's holding in the case does not entirely countenance its commit-
ment to secularism.
Ironically, the Court invoked the constitutional theme of secularism
and religious harmony in resolving the second legal question of acquiring
private property on the undisputed area. The Court asserted that, "[a]ny
step taken to arrest escalation of communal tension and to achieve commu-
nal accord and harmony can, by no stretch of argumentation, be termed non-
secular much less anti-secular or against the concept of secularism- a
creed of the Indian people embedded in the ethos., 84 Additionally, the
Court rejected the Muslim argument that the acquisition of a mosque is con-
trary to Islamic law by emphasizing the supremacy of secularism in legal
matters. 5 The Court's definition of secularism, in this sense, contradicts the
Indian definition of secularism as freedom of exercise by suggesting an ab-
sence of religion is the real meaning of secularism. In sum, even though
the Supreme Court immersed its rationale in the rhetoric of constitutional
secularism, its interpretation of the meaning of secularism and the outcome
80 The actual ownership of the site was the subject of the dispute. But while the case was
pending in the Court, the site was theoretically "public" property.
81 Koenraad Elst, Ayodhya and After, available at http://www.bharatvani.org/books/
ayodhyay/chl.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
82 id.
83 See id.
84 Faruqui v. Union of India, AIR 1995 S.C. 605, 633.
85 "Irrespective of the status of a mosque in Islamic country for the purpose of immunity
from acquisition by the State in exercise of the sovereign power, its status and immunity
from acquisition in the secular ethos of India under the Constitution is the same and equal to
that of the places of worship of the other religions." Id. at 641.
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of the legal questions indicates that secularism and religious equality was
not the Court's primary concern in Faruqui.
In Faruqui, the Court implicitly encouraged judicial defiance by allow-
ing Hindus, who had violated an earlier court holding, to continue worship-
ping on the site. Why did the Court act as an enabler on one hand, while
invoking values of secularism on the other?
The disconnect between the language of secularism deployed by the
Indian Supreme Court and the action actually taken is a result of the Court's
own biases. 86 Since the majority of the legal and political elites in the In-
dian government are a product of Western education, the members of the
Court and other legal authorities have had little difficulty in framing the rule
of the law as embodied in the Constitution.8 7 However, the Court's effort to
rid itself of its own pro-Hindu biases, as well as create an enforcement
mechanism to transform deeply rooted social beliefs, has not been as suc-
cessful. This is readily apparent in the dubious Faruqui decision, where the
Court devoted considerable energy to articulate a pro-Hindu rationale,
where the more logical approach would have been to adhere to the High
Court precedent prohibiting all forms of worship. Bridging the gap of reli-
gious equality in theory and religious equality in practice reflects the con-
flicting forces within Indian political culture and its relationship to constitu-
tionalism. 88
In light of this perspective, the inherent biases and prejudices embed-
ded into the judicial institution impeded the constitutional goals of secular-
ism and religious equality. More specifically, because religious beliefs are
so deeply connected to views on public policy, a strict separatist approach to
secularism is not institutionally possible in India. Accounting for
the intimacy with which temporal and spiritual realms have been histori-
cally entwined in India, the prospect is substantial that important areas of
public policy will embody the substance of religious beliefs, at least by the
majority. So understood, secularism appears in the form of a radical ma-
joritarianism in the service of an assimilationist agenda.89
Since the Indian interpretation of secularism does not connote an escape
from religion, rather a freedom of exercise, it is increasingly difficult to
undermine the power of religion to weaken democratic forces. Faruqui
illustrates that even neutral, well-educated judges fall victim to revealing
their majoritarian religious biases when deciding a dispute involving Hindus
and Muslims.
86 "One aspect of this problem is the continued, practical dominance of members of upper
castes within the political, social, economic, and legal institutions of India." MCHUGH, supra
note 32, at 105.
87 MCHUGH, supra note 32, at 110.
88 MCHUGH, supra note 32, at 105.
89 JACOBSORN, supra note 10, at 55.
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B. The Early Polygamy Cases
Conversely, the Supreme Court defeated a majoritarian approach to
secularism in the early polygamy cases. By upholding legislation that out-
lawed polygamous marriages, which was pervasive in Hindu tradition to
procure the birth of a son and hedge against reproductive failure, the Court
asserted the primacy of social reform measures over religious liberty. In the
1952 case of State of Bombay v. Appa, the Bombay Supreme Court upheld
the validity of the Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriages Act of
1946, asserting that "The Hindu Bigamous Marriages Act is attempting to
bring about social reform in a community which has looked upon polygamy
as not an evil institution, but fully justified by its religion." 90 By prioritizing
social reform measures over elements of Hindu personal law, the Appa
Court seemed to vindicate a neutral, non-majoritarian approach to interpret-
ing secularism. Even though this decision does not elucidate the Court's
behavior towards Muslims or other religious minorities, it demonstrates the
Court's ability to remain unbiased when dealing with traditional aspects of
deeply held religious beliefs.
However, a closer look at the Court's approach in the polygamy cases
does not reflect an unfettered commitment to constitutional secularism, but
demonstrates its ad hoc tendency to construe and define religious protec-
tion. The outcome of the polygamy cases seems to uphold secular values,
but the method of analysis grants complete discretion to the Court to ascer-
tain what religious values should be superceded by public interest measures,
and under what conditions this should occur. The Court's self-appointed
task of differentiating between expendable and non-expendable religious
activity, "allows [it] to deeply encroach into the domain of religious free-
dom."91 In this sense, the constitutional adjudication of secularist provi-
sions has facilitated a degree of judicial opportunism by allowing judges to
define and decide the scope of religious freedom.
C. Faruqui Revisited
The Supreme Court's ambiguity in its interpretation of constitutional
secularism in Faruqui precipitated a further consideration of the issues. In
March of 2002 the Court issued an order mandating that no religious activ-
ity of any kind by anyone either symbolic or actual including bhumipuja or
shila puja (types of worship), shall be permitted or allowed to take place, on
any part of the sixty-seven acre undisputed plot. In response to this order,
the Central Government filed an application seeking vacation of its interim
90 State of Bombay v. Appa, AIR Bombay 84, 88 (1952), cited in JACOBSOHN, supra note
10, at 99.
91 JACOBSOHN, supra note 10, at 97.
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order banning all kinds of religious activity on the sixty-seven acre site.
Subsequently, the Court reconsidered the constitutionality of the Acquisition
of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act of 1993, as amended by the 2002 Supreme
Court order in Mohd. Aslam @ Bhure v. Union of India92 in March of 2003.
Unlike its decision in Faruqui, the Court in this case assumed a more
neutral position in its interpretation of Article 15. While acknowledging
that no title rights are in dispute over the sixty-seven acre plot, and admit-
ting that not allowing real property holders to worship on their own land
was in some sense a denial of rights, the Court emphasized that the restric-
tion is necessary to ensure that "the final outcome of adjudication should
not be rendered meaningless by the existence of properties belonging to
Hindus in the vicinity of the disputed structure in case the Muslims are
found entitled to the disputed site. 93 The Court's brilliant insight preemp-
tively avoided a potentially abusive situation: if the Muslims were held to
be the rightful owners of the 2.77 acres of the disputed site (where the Babri
Mosque had stood), the Hindus could have denied access to the Muslims'
rightful property if they were permitted to maintain control of their private
property on the 67 acres of undisputed land surrounding the disputed site.
Thus, the Court's forward looking decision that required Hindus to tempo-
rarily relinquish control of property on the undisputed site, was the only
way to guarantee a fair outcome for Muslims.
Exhibiting a stark divergence from its rationale in Faruqui, the Court
seriously addressed the issue of fairness to the Muslim minority by prohibit-
ing any religious activity on the undisputed site in order to guarantee a just
result of the impending issue involving the disputed site. This time, the
Court invoked notions of secularism accurately to justify its deference to the
religious minority. In fact, the Court rationalized temporarily seizing pri-
vate property [the undisputed site] by relying on the goals of secularism:
Even though, primafacie, the acquisition of the adjacent area in respect of
which there is no dispute of title and which belongs to Hindus may appear
to be a slant against the Hindus, [i]t is not so since it is for the larger na-
tional purpose of maintaining and promoting communal harmony and in
consonance with the creed of secularism. 94
For the first time since the beginning of the Ayodhya controversy, the
Court interpreted secular provisions in accordance with the Framers' origi-
nal understanding of freedom of exercise. The Court's analysis clearly re-
flects a commitment to protecting the rights of the Muslim minority. Addi-
tionally, the Court epitomized neutrality and professionalism by taking both
Hindu and Muslim concerns seriously.
92 Mohd. Aslam @ Bhure v. Union of India, 2003 SOL Case No. 227, available at
http://www.supremecourtonline.com/cases/7590.
9' Id. para. 13.
94 Id
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In light of the Court's shift against Hindu worship on the undisputed
site, and adherence to the no worship rule of the 2002 order, it is worthwhile
to explore whether Mohd. Aslam is paradigmatic of a more neutral, tolerant
Supreme Court that is committed to achieving constitutional secularism or if
it is another example of the Court employing goals of secularism to propa-
gate its own political agenda.
D. Ayodhya Today
Since its 2003 decision in Mohd. Aslam, the Supreme Court has per-
mitted the Central Government to establish a joint trust, The Ayodhya Jama
Masjid Trust ("AJMT"), comprised of Hindu and Muslim trustees who are
responsible for proposing amicable solutions to the land dispute to the gov-
ernment. The AJMT signifies a major breakthrough in resolving the long-
lasting conflict between Hindus and Muslims by promoting open communi-
cation. In recent months, the AJMT has urged Prime Minister Vajpayee to
execute the Ayodhya Act, which provides for construction of a temple, a
mosque, and other facilities at the acquired land (the disputed site) in
Ayodhya.95 Many Indian leaders believe that the Supreme Court's com-
mitment to secularism in the Ayodhya legal disputes memorialized a fresh,
harmonious social climate in Ayodhya, where Hindus and Muslims will be
able to worship together. In a recent news article, Deputy Prime Minister
Advani, a crucial figure for the BJP party, supported the construction of
both a temple and a mosque on the acquired site: "I am sure that we will
use whatever persuasive power we in the government and in the BJP have
over those who had launched the movement for Ram Temple at Ayodhya to
participate in any amicable settlement on Ayodhya. ' 96
The new air of cooperation is not completely divorced from politics,
since some reports indicate that the upcoming election is the BJP's driving
force in reconciliation with Muslims over Ayodhya and is merely a cam-
paign measure to appeal to Hindu and Muslim voters alike.97 BJP leaders
are cognizant that the Ayodhya violence will always be a part of its ideo-
logical personality, and are attempting to dissociate the party's connection
to violence in Ayodhya as the election mood spreads throughout the coun-
try. 98 Because the Ayodhya case is deeply connected to political power, the
Supreme Court's commitment to constitutional secularism is more accu-
95 See Joint Trust Proposes Solution to Ayodhya Issue, at http://news.indianinfo.com
2004/01/06/0601ayodhya.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2004).
96 Advani Endorses Dalai Lama's Ayodhya Call, January 9, 2004, at
http://www.rediff.com/news/2004/jan/09adv.htm (last visited Jan. 12,2004).
97 The election took place in May 2004, where the Congress Party defeated the BJP on
account of a dramatic voting effort by the rural poor in India.
98 Ayodhya, always a Part of BJP Ideology: Jaitley, January 13, 2004, at
http://news.indiainfo.com/2004/01/13/130 ljaitley.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2004).
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rately ascertainable in an independent context. More specifically, investi-
gating case law outside of the Ayodhya sphere provides an answer to the
question of whether the Court is invoking goals of secularism to belie its
own opportunistic behavior.
E. Beyond Ayodhya
The legitimacy of the Supreme Court's commitment towards constitu-
tional secularism is more accurately ascertainable in case law arising after
the mosque destruction, but unrelated to the property dispute case. The
Court's commitment to constitutional secularism was put to the test shortly
after the mosque destruction, in May of 1993, when it was approached by a
group of Muslim imams-individuals in charge of religious activities of
respective mosques. The imams brought a petition challenging ancient Is-
lamic religious practice that denied imams any form of monetary compensa-
tion because Islamic law, imposed by local government officials, required
them to offer voluntary service. In All India Imam Organisation v. Union of
India & Ors., the Supreme Court demonstrated its ability to uphold its con-
stitutional obligations by disregarding Islamic personal law and protecting
the constitutional rights of the imams. According to the Court, the rights of
the imams must be interpreted in context of modern constitutional protec-
tions, and not ancient deep-seeded beliefs. The Court explained, "In series
of decisions rendered by this Court it has been held that right to life in Arti-
cle 21 means right to live with human dignity. It is too late in the day,
therefore to claim or urge that since Imams perform religious duties they are
not entitled to any emoluments. Whatever may have been the ancient con-
cept but it has undergone change." 99
The Court's approach in this case seems to reflect a major break-
through towards constitutional secularism: in a time where anti-Muslim
sentiments were at its peak, the Court exhibited no signs of pro-Hindu bi-
ases and gave real meaning to constitutional protections. Although All In-
dia Imam was not a conflict arising from a controversy between Hindus and
Muslims, it signified the Court's progress in shedding anti-Muslim biases
and seriously contemplating the interests of a religious minority. As one
author explains, "Making the prospects for such creative jurisprudence more
promising is the fact that the majority emphasized the supremacy of Indian
courts, rather than Muslim law as interpreted by Muslim legal authorities, in
determining the essentials of Islamic practice."00
Notwithstanding the Court's progress in giving real meaning to secu-
larist constitutional provisions in cases like All India Imam Organisation, a
99 All India Imam Organisation v. Union of India & Ors., 1993 SOL Case No. 098, para.
5, available at http://www.supremecourtonline.com/cases/2939.html.
100 JACOBSOHN, supra note 10, at 258.
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strict separatist approach towards secularism is not supportable in a nation
like India, where religious beliefs saturate the social ethos of the culture.
Thus, the Court should not have unlimited authority to intervene in religious
matters. One lawyer, who represented the Muslim side in the Ayodhya liti-
gation, claimed:
the Court's verdict that the right to pray at a mosque (as opposed to prayer
in the open) was not to be regarded as a constitutionally protected practice
of particular significance must gnaw at the roots of any version of plural
secularism, surrendering the property and practice of a faith to extensive
interference by the State and annihilating the diversity of local practices
which make the Indian subcontinent what it is)°
These remarks illustrate the challenges facing the Indian Supreme Court:
how does it strike a balance between allowing citizens to exercise their
freedom of religion without infringing on others' rights to be free from the
imposition of religion?
The Supreme Court encountered this precise issue in a 2002 case in-
voking Article 28's prohibition on religious instruction in public educational
institutitions.10 2 In Roy v. Union of India, the Court held that teaching re-
ligion in State-funded schools was not a violation of Article 28 because an
effort "to educate children to understand the common factors in all the relig-
ions is not a non-secular step."'10 3 In fact, the Court intrepidly asserted that
imparting accurate knowledge of all religions to the nation's youth will be a
solution to the problems of religious strife, and will ultimately eradicate
non-secular sentiments throughout the country. 14 The Court attempted to
achieve its balancing act by relying on traditional notions of secularism and
religious equality:
The real meaning of secularism in the language of Gandhi [means] equal
treatment and respect for all religions, but we have misunderstood the
meaning of secularism [to mean] negation of all religions [ ... ] Democ-
racy cannot survive and [the] Constitution cannot work unless Indian citi-
zens are not only learned and intelligent, but they are also of moral charac-
ter and imbibe the inherent virtues of human-being such as truth, love and
compassion.105
While the Court tipped the balance in favor of religious education in
Roy, perhaps the trying responsibility of achieving a fine balance indicates
that the courts are not the best-equipped institutions to promote secular
101 Rajeev Dhavan 1994, cited in Jacobsohn, supra note 10, at 258.
102 Roy v. Union of India, 2002 SOL Case No. 502, available at http://www.supremecourt
online.com/cases/7371 .html.
103 Id. para. 85.
104 Id.
105 Id. para. 84, 86.
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goals. Additionally, by overstepping its judicial authority, excessive inter-
vention has the ability to undermine judicial legitimacy. Even when justi-
fied, these interventions have the potential to damage the institutional le-
gitimacy of the Court by questioning its role as a neutral arbiter in matters
central to people's fervently held beliefs. 0 6
IV. The Non-adjudicative Trust Mechanism
A. Alternate Dispute Resolution in Ayodhya
Are there alternative forums to time consuming and expensive court
proceedings that can resolve religious disputes? The rules relating to arbi-
tration were most recently enumerated in the Indian Arbitration & Concilia-
tion Act of 1996, which is based on the Model Law on International Com-
merce Arbitration adopted by the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law (UNCITRAL).10 7 The legislation reflects the first time
that India has seen a single law applicable both to international and domes-
tic arbitrations. Furthermore, it repeals the Indian Arbitration Act 1940, the
Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act 1937 and the Foreign Awards
(Recognition and Enforcement) 1961, which previously governed the law of
arbitration in India.10 8 In a commercial context, the new arbitration laws
were intended to accommodate the needs of foreign investors and busi-
nessmen by guaranteeing an expeditious settlement of legal disputes in con-
trast to India's backlogged legal system.109 The 1996 Indian arbitration
laws do not contain a catalogue of disputes that are arbitrable, and only con-
tains a general provision stipulating that the new law will not supercede
existing law that prohibits arbitration of certain disputes.
In light of the liberal scope of arbitration laws, issues involving a reli-
gious dispute like the Ayodhya case, are not beyond the purview of domes-
tic or international arbitration in India. Notwithstanding the benefits of time
and reduced expenses, cases involving secular constitutional provisions
involve the protection of such fundamental rights that an alternate forum of
resolution presents a great risk in safeguarding these freedoms. One author
identifies some of these risks:
[i]t is self-evident that constitutional disputes cannot be referred to arbitra-
tion under any circumstances. The framers of the Constitution intended it
to be interpreted only by the Supreme Court and the various High Courts;
106 JACOBSOHN, supra note 10, at 258.
107 See The Indian Courts- A Lifetime of Litigation. What Alternative to the Indian Courts?
The Key, October 2000, at http://www.kennedyslaw.com/newsletter/ news23/newsl.htm
(last visited Sept. 9, 2003).
108 Vinay Reddy and V. Nagaraj, Arbitrability: The Indian Perspective, 19 Journal of Inter-
national Arbitration (2002) 117, 131-32.
109 Id. at 117.
20051
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
allowing an arbitrator to decide such matters would amount to a violation
of the basic structure of the constitution.10
Therefore, the unprecedented use of binding ADR measures in disposing of
constitutional issues may be too novel of a method to apply to the Ayodhya
dispute.
B. Mediation and Third-Party Intervention
The January 2004 summit of the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation in Islamabad, Pakistan marked a major step forward in building
the road to peace and establishing a mechanism of trust between India and
Pakistan."' UN Secretary General Kofi Annan identified an important by-
product of improved relations between India and Pakistan as not only reduc-
ing political tension, but also improving economic and social conditions
through the region.1 2 The emergence of a cooperative climate between the
two nations makes the role of mediation and neutral third-party intervention
an even more promising solution to resolving the Ayodhya property dispute.
Relying on a non-adjudicative trust mechanism to settle the property dispute
initially seems like an effective and efficient solution.
In late January 2004, the Dalai Lama, a Tibetan spiritual leader, offered
to mediate the issue as an objective third-party. 13 The Dalai Lama's integ-
rity and stature as a spiritual leader, and absence of personal stake in the
issue (he is Buddhist and is affiliated with neither religion) make him an
excellent candidate for the job. 14 While Hindu and Muslim leaders have
welcomed the Dalai Lama's offer of mediation, a negotiated settlement has
not yet materialized between Hindus and Muslims." The Dalai Lama has
insisted that the Hindu and Muslim communities must demonstrate mutual
trust and respect for each other in order to reach any type of agreement"16
However, the leader's attempt to reverse basic attitudes and beliefs that cre-
ated and aggravated the dispute in the first place may be an almost impossi-
ble task. 117 Given the severity of religious tension between Hindus and
"0 Id. at 124.
11' Vajpayee Vows to Resolve Disputes with Pakistan, February 2, 2004, available at
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=storyl-2-2004_pg72 (last visited Febru-
ary 2, 2004).
112 UN's Annan Hails India-Pakistan Progress, January 7, 2004, available at
http://au.news.yahoo.com/040107/19/n61h.html (last visited February 2, 2004).
".. New Ayodhya Initiative: Dalai Lama may have to First Change Some Attitudes and
Promises, January 16, 2004, available at http://www.deccanherald.com/ deccanherald/
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Muslims in India, a third party intervention may be neither effective or au-
thoritative enough to permanently resolve the issue in Ayodhya. Further-
more, enforcing a solution that was facilitated by a third party foreigner
poses great long-term challenges.
A more commanding source of mediation like a UN backed interven-
tion may prove to be more effective in resolving the Ayodhya dispute. In
fact, the religious tension between Hindus and Muslims was brought to the
attention of the UN as early as 1949, when the UN established the United
Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan ("UNMOGIP") to
supervise the ceasefire temporarily agreed upon by India and Paksitan in the
states of Jammu and Kashmir, a mountainous region straddling the
neighbors' northern regions whose boundary disputes have caused two wars
between the countries.' 8 However, the UN's unsuccessful efforts in resolv-
ing the Kashmir dispute has generated skepticism among Indian officials
who perceive the UN to be a highly political institution that capitulates to
prevailing political considerations.' 9 Additionally, the Indian Government
has insisted that bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan represents
the most effective method to settle the Kashmir dispute because it will con-
sider the needs of the people of Jammu and Kashmir rather than internation-
alize the issue. 120 Thus, the UN's approach towards the Kashmir problem
has caused South Asians to lose faith in the institution's mediating powers.
Since the issue in Kashmir is still pending despite UN involvement, it
is likely that Indian officials will be reluctant to seek UN assistance in re-
solving the Ayodhya property dispute and will aspire for internal resolution
of the problem. Additionally, the dispute in Ayodhya is not a conflict be-
tween two States; rather a problem between two groups within the same
country. Thus, the UN may encounter procedural limitations in establishing
jurisdiction over the dispute.
C. Indispensable Judiciary?
India's best chance of settling the Ayodhya dispute is through internal
resolution and not turning to the international community for an answer.
Even though third party mediation is an appealing alternative to litigation, it
is very likely that neither Hindus nor Muslims will comply with the decision
of an outside party who lacks institutional authority within the country.
However imperfect, the judiciary is ultimately the most appropriate institu-
118 UN website, at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmogip/ (last visited February
2, 2004).
119 Chinmaya R. Gharekhan, India, Pakistan and the U.N., THE HINDU, November 2,
2003, available at http://www.thehindu.com/2003/02/1 1/stories/ 2003021100471000.htm
(last visited February 2, 2004).
120 See India, Pakistan raise Kashmir issue in UN Security Council, May 14, 2003, avail-
able at http://www.rediff.com//news/2003/may/14un.htm (last visited February 2, 2004).
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tion to interpret and adhere to nuanced Indian secularism because it is best
equipped to perform the balancing act between constitutional values and
social beliefs. Additionally, it possesses the truth-seeking and moral author-
ity needed to enforce any type of settlement in Ayodhya. Since the Court's
decision in Mohd Aslam, the Court has greatly evolved by ridding itself of
institutional biases and has revived an understanding of constitutional secu-
larism that the Framers of the Indian Constitution originally envisioned.
The Court's approach in resolving the Ayodhya dispute since Faruqui af-
firms its ability to remain neutral and protect the freedom of exercise for
religious minorities. In the face of political pressure exerted by members of
the BJP, the Court has honored its dedication to preserving constitutional
secularism.' 2' The Court's protection of religious minorities in other issues
outside of the Ayodhya controversy support its understanding of constitu-
tional secularism.
This does not suggest that the judiciary is the sole actor in the process
of constitutional interpretation, rather, it supports the theory of a "collabora-
tive constitutional enterprise."'' 22 This type of process allows an active as-
sertion of judicial review by the Court without conferring upon it a power of
ultimate finality in constitutional interpretation. However, the collaborative
process "does not require relinquishment of primary institutional responsi-
bility for clarifying and elaborating meanings that define the nation, but it
does argue for humility and restraint."' 123 If the Court is able to exercise a
level of judicial modesty in acting as the final interpretive authority, then
the peril of losing institutional legitimacy will also diminish.
V. Conclusion
Upon exploring the benefits and detriments of the judicial role in set-
tling religious disputes and protecting secular values, the Court has re-
deemed itself from its Faruqui days and has reemerged as the most
equipped institution to preserve goals of constitutional secularism. In the
aftermath of Ayodhya, many constitutional scholars have suggested a need
for a "constitutional revolution" to bridge the gap between the "written" and
"unwritten"'' 24 Constitution in order to eliminate social inequalities and cir-
cumscribe judicial opportunism. However, this type of complete revolution
will never exist in the context of Indian secularism because social life can
never be totally dissociated from the loaded religious environment in In-
121 See generally PM Wants Mandate for Temple, Feb. 8, 2004, available at
http:/lwww.rediff.com/news/2004/feb/07ayo.htm (discussing Prime Minister Vajpayee's
effort to complete construction of the Ram Temple).
122 JACOBSOHN, supra note 10, at 249.
123 id.
124 Id. at 233.
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dia. 1 25 The Indian Constitution clearly supports these transformations, but
only in attenuated forms, because balancing its commitment to democratic
values and its cognizance of religiously based affiliations preclude their
total revolutionary grasp. 126 Moreover, the existence of at least a small gap
between aspiration and achievement may facilitate a more sensitive political
climate to promote values of constitutional secularism.1
27
Additionally, the threat of judicial overreach into areas of privately
held religious beliefs does not pose as great a concern as it did in the pre-
Ayodhya era. Having endured shocking episodes of communal violence,
the Supreme Court vindicated its dedication to constitutional values of secu-
larism. In fact, committed secularists have little to fear from judicial su-
premacy, since the courts have proven to be the institution responsible for
reviving and defining the essence of Indian constitutionalism in cases like
Mohd. Aslam. 128  The Supreme Court's behavior in the wake of the
Ayodhya controversy illustrates its capacity to balance competing interests
of constitutional protection and religious liberties in order to salvage
homemade secularism in a nation born with aching religious diversity.
125 Id. at 234.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 259.
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